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Stiegler, and Kittler aligns with media archaeology practices in terms of discourse networks. Next, I
consider how Foucault’s lectures from the Collège de France can be used to extend current media
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experimental processes of subjectivation.
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Introduction 
While media archaeology emerged primarily out of the work of early Foucauldian 
frameworks and methods, it has not been fully reconciled with the genealogical 
approaches of his later lectures from the Collège de France beginning in 1970. While 
some scholars have begun to call for such an approach, this work has primarily focused 
on analyzing the ways in which previous scholarship happens to align with some of 
the frameworks of a media genealogy methodology.1 Following and then extending 
this work, my paper argues for a methodological approach to media genealogy that 
emphasizes the importance of processes of subjectivation, which requires studying the 
larger context of the technology as well as the histories of which it is a part. The 
process of subjectivation is driven by the “relationships of power” or “field of forces” 
within which a subject exists and constitutes itself. The concept of media used here is 
meant to apply broadly. Alexander Monea and Jeremy Packer define media as “tools 
of governance that shape knowledge and produce and sustain power relations while 
simultaneously forming their attendant subjects.”2 Such a definition allows for a media 
genealogy approach to be applied to a wide variety of technologies beyond those more 
traditionally considered to be a medium.  
Media genealogy does not replace, but rather extends the methods of media 
archaeology in ways that make clearer the intersections of media studies with broader 
fields such as science, technology, philosophy, and even art. One question that remains 
unanswered about the epistemic shifts analyzed through media archaeology is how 
one might intervene in the role that technology plays in shaping us as subjects. For 
example, Stiegler shows how one can examine the impact of a specific medium, such 
as cinema, on how we understand the world, following Kittler’s emphasis on a 
presupposition of mediality and media specificity.3 However, of note, Jussi Parikka 
calls attention to the fact that often the work that emphasizes political analysis and 
the work that emphasizes media specificity are mutually exclusive.4 In the case of 
Stiegler’s Technics and Time series, there is only brief mention of cognitive capitalism 
and how it might relate to his ontological and epistemological theory. For example, 
he refers to Hollywood as the capital of industrial schematism as a means of a brief 
transition into a larger discussion about the political economy of consciousness, but 
the cinematic form of consciousness that he aims to develop is done so without the 
                                               
1 Monea, Alexander, and Jeremy Packer. 2016. “Media Genealogy and the Politics of Archaeology.” 
International Journal of Communication 10: 3141–59. 
2 Ibid. 3152. 
3 Stiegler, Bernard. 2011. Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise. Translated by 
Stephen Francis Barker. Meridian, Crossing Aesthetics. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
4 Parikka, Jussi. 2012. What Is Media Archaeology? Cambridge: Polity Press. 
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 larger context of the cognitive capitalism of Hollywood.5  
In contrast, I argue that politics are inherently intertwined with these 
approaches. Most importantly, the genealogical emphasis on processes of 
subjectivation allows for the emergence of art as a form of technē that more fully opens 
up experimental approaches to one’s own processes of subjectivation in their current 
milieu. Conceptually, this practice bridges Foucault’s later genealogical work with 
Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s work on processes of subjectivation. In particular, 
for Guattari, machines are the conceptual operators of the assemblage.6 The methods 
developed in this article will consist of first understanding how the machine operates 
as it constructs subjects by drawing on the genealogical tools of Foucault and then 
taking the next step of actively intervening in those processes through an aesthetic-
ethical form of experimentation that Anne Sauvagnargues calls an artmachine.7 This 
openness to radical experimentation through the artmachine is a risky political act 
that intentionally echoes Baruch Spinoza’s ethical imperative to ask what a body can 
do.8 Such experimentation opens wide the aesthetic paradigm that makes clear the 
uncertain and always metastable state of the assemblages which surround us and also 
create us. For this reason, the aesthetic emphasis on experimentation is of utmost 
importance for generating new processes of subjectivation.  
By moving from archaeology to genealogy, one’s research methods become 
inextricably entangled in the intersections of not only critical cultural communication 
and media studies, but also science, philosophy, and art. By embracing a method of 
analysis and experimentation through processes of subjectivation, media genealogy 
can engage in increasingly broader discussions about the impact of media both on 
how we understand the world and are constructed as subjects within that world.  
 
Media Archaeology and Discourse Networks  
In this section, I will show how the works of Foucault, Kittler, and Stiegler participate 
in media archaeological methods that highlight discourse networks. After analyzing 
the way that such work follows current media archaeological practices, I will consider 
in the next section how this can be extended through Foucault’s genealogical methods 
in his later work. In Archaeology of Knowledge,9 Foucault attempts to explicitly lay out 
                                               
5 Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3, 37-38. 
6 Sauvagnargues, Anne. 2016. Artmachines: Deleuze, Guattari, Simondon. Translated by Suzanne 
Verderber and Eugene W. Holland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Spinoza, Baruch. 1994. Ethics: Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect and Selected Letters. 
9 Foucault, Michel. 2002. The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
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 a method that was used imperfectly in his earlier works such as Madness and 
Civilization10 and The Order of Things.11 He defines his archaeological method as the 
process of uncovering the conditions of knowledge as they take shape in discourse. 
Before this method, language analysis focused on which particular rules allowed 
statements to be made. Foucault’s description of the events of discourses asks a much 
different question: “how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than 
another?”12   
The emphasis in this method is on discourse itself, which entails examining 
statements as real and manifestly present, considering only what has been formulated, 
which importantly, also includes those things that have been left out as gaps in what 
is said.13 These are disconnected from any individual subject, or 
transcendental/collective consciousness. In other words, statements must be taken at 
face value rather than endeavoring to search for any authorial intent that might exist 
behind such statements. This method focuses on knowledge in that it explores the 
relation between discursive practice and knowledge, or savoir, in the original French. 
Savoir, in contrast to connaissance, refers to “the conditions that are necessary in a 
particular period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance [relation of 
the subject to the object] and for this or that enunciation to be formulated.”14 It 
explores the conditions that make it possible to utter a particular statement in the 
first place. These conditions are the dynamic set of relations that make up the archive, 
which is the law of what can be said. One limitation of this method is that it is 
impossible to describe one’s own contemporary archive precisely because of one’s 
location within it as a limiting factor of what can be seen and said.   
Foucault lays out three guidelines for analyzing the rules of formation of 
objects: (1) the surfaces of emergence, or the context in which the object is situated, 
(2) the authorities of delimitation, and (3) the grids of specification, or the systems by 
which an object is structured and differentiated.15 Further, this leads to four 
consequences: (1) objects do not pre-exist their emergence, (2) object is defined by 
exterior relations with other objects in a field of exteriority, (3) relations must be 
                                               
10 Foucault, Michel. 1988. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Vintage 
Books Ed., Nov. 1988. New York: Random House. 
11 Foucault, Michel. 1994. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Vintage books 
edition. New York NY: Vintage Books. 
12 Foucault, Michel. 2010. The Government of Self and Others: Lecture at the Collège de France 1982-1983. 
Edited by Frédéric Gros. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Macmillan. 30. 
13 Deleuze, Gilles. 1988. Foucault. Translated by Seán Hand. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 3.  
14 Translator’s reference, original source not given in Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
15 Ibid. 44-54. 
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 distinguished by primary relations, and (4) discursive relations take place at the limit 
of discourse, determining the group of relations necessary to speak of any particular 
object.   
The set of relations between a discursive formation and the sciences is called 
an episteme: “the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive 
practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized 
systems.”16 Foucault then considers potential wider applications of his archaeological 
method, moving beyond analyses of epistemes. One example he offers is how this 
method might be used with a painting. Rather than the more traditional focus on the 
meaning of a painting, an archaeological approach would try to show the discursive 
practices that have been embodied in the techniques and gestures of the painter.   
Yet, Foucault’s analyses are limited in an important way. According to Kittler, 
Foucault’s analyses all focused on discourse networks that consisted of libraries.17 
However, discourse networks consist of more than just libraries, especially beginning 
with what Kittler referred to as the 1900 discourse network. This is offered as one 
potential reason that Foucault’s own historical research did not extend past 1850. In 
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, Kittler points out that Foucault was not able to see that 
even writing itself is a technology, and in fact served as universal medium before the 
concept of a medium existed.18 An important project for Kittler then, was expanding 
Foucault’s methods into discourse networks that include other forms of media such as 
information networks: “Archaeologies of the present must also take into account data 
storage, transmission, and calculation in technical media.”19 Geoffrey Winthrop-
Young argues that, whereas for Foucault epistemes shifted inexplicably, Kittler 
demonstrates how such epistemic shifts are correlated with shifts in media by 
exploring the ways that power circulates through the hardware and software that 
makes up technical media systems, through his insistence on the presupposition of 
exteriority, mediality, and corporeality.20 Deleuze and Guattari’s exploration of 
postsignifying semiotics adds an additional complexity by demonstrating that 
                                               
16 Ibid. 211. 
17 Kittler, Friedrich A. 1990. Discourse Networks 1800/1900. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
18 See Kittler, Friedrich. 1999. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Writing Science. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press. Though Foucault did not analyze print as a technology, the enormous role of 
print culture in cultural, political, and economic structures has been argued by scholars such as 
Eisenstein (2009) and Johns (1998).   
19 Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900. 369 
20 Winthrop-Young, Geoffrey. 2011. Kittler and the Media. Theory and Media. Cambridge: Polity. 
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 signification is only one way that we can approach reality.21,22 Technical media are now 
capable of bypassing human interpretation through their use of postsignifying 
semiotics.  
One question that remains unanswered about epistemic shifts is how we might 
intervene in the role that technology plays in shaping us as subjects. In Technics and 
Time, 3, Bernard Stiegler makes concrete the degree to which technics impact our 
forms of knowledge and the way that we see the world through our ēpistēmē.23 The 
invention of analog sound recording allowed humans, for the first time ever, to 
experience exactly the same thing twice. For Stiegler, what this demonstrates is 
precisely that each experience, though it may be of the exact same audio, is really a 
different experience, because we bring to it new anticipations based on our having 
heard it before. This elucidates the way that technical objects serve as a tertiary 
memory that consists of our heritage and background knowledge, and actually serves 
as the foundation for primary and secondary memory.24 These technical systems create 
epochs, and when we transition to an epoch because of a new technical system, we 
likewise face a disruption that must be negotiated using the technical object itself. 
This notion echoes Kittler’s analysis of epistemic shifts that are correlated with shifts 
in media.  
However, for Stiegler, cinematography plays a unique role in that he sees it as 
mimicking the way that consciousness itself works, through their similar processes of 
editing by joining experiences into a single flow using montage. This similarity also 
explains the persuasive power of cinematography. Due to the aforementioned 
industrialization of this tertiary memory, Stiegler argues that the process of the 
collective individuation of a ‘We’ is stifled, creating existential suffering, or malaise.25 
Although this process itself is industrialized, Stiegler does point to it as an area for 
potential resistance, allowing the possibility that we might ourselves be able to 
determine what counts as our heritage through the process of crafting a future.   
The arguments presented in these three works serve as a fundamental example 
of the type of work that the field of media archaeology can undertake. First, they 
emphasize one of the key themes of media archaeology, which seeks to understand 
what it means to be modern and to be in the world, with special emphasis on the 
                                               
21 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
22 Félix Guattari. 1977. Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics, Peregrine Books Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, England; New York, N.Y., U.S.A: Penguin. 
23 Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3. 
24 Stiegler, Bernard. 2009. Technics and Time 2: Disorientation. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Univ. Press. 
25 Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3, 93-103. 
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 media experiences of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.26 Moving beyond 
merely analyzing how media shape our ēpistēmē, Stiegler argues that technics are a 
fundamental ontological part of the human experience and that, in actuality, the 
human experience has always already been caught up in and is inseparable from 
technics. This takes seriously Foucault’s claim that the archive constructs what is 
seeable and sayable, while at the same time adding technics inextricably to the 
perceptual apparatus. Through an emphasis on epochs generated by specific technical 
objects and systems, Stiegler also offers an example of how media archaeology can 
examine the impact of specific media on how we understand the world, following 
Kittler’s emphasis on a presupposition of mediality and media specificity. For 
example, though cinematography holds a special position because of its similarity with 
consciousness, cinema has also converged with digital media and is being shaped, 
altered, and moved beyond in ways that are important to consider. Specifically, the 
impact of networks as a technical epoch brings with it new challenges to the way that 
we understand time and memory.  
Stiegler's work, also drawing at times on Simondonian concepts such as 
individuation, gives a concrete example of how Félix Guattari understands the role of 
semiotic layers in his machinic regime. What is seeable and sayable is limited because 
we are constructed as subjects by and through the technics that are inextricably linked 
to our perceptual apparatus – we are shaped within the confines of the semiotic layers 
in which we individuate. However, whereas Stiegler notes some possibility for the 
crafting of our own future, Guattari identifies a radical openness to experimentation. 
This experimentation is also inherently political for Guattari, as we experiment to 
move away from empire and capitalist regimes of subjectivation.27 The question 
remains, then, how does one study these processes of subjectivation as a way to better 
experiment with them?  
 
Process of Subjectivation in the Collège de France Lectures 
In developing this shift from media archaeology to media genealogy, it is important 
to understand not only Foucault’s genealogical methods, but the way that he theorizes 
the concept of technology in his work. Foucault uses the concept of technology quite 
                                               
26 Parikka, What is Media Archaeology? 
27 Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that this work adheres to Maurizo 
Lazzarato’s argument in Signs and Machines that capital plays a significant role in processes of 
subjectivation. Further, the media genealogy methods explored herein can and ought to be used to 
further explore the relationship between capital and processes of subjectivation, while at the same 
time experimenting with alternative processes.  
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 broadly, as seen through the lens of contemporary philosophy of technology.28 This 
perspective conceives of technology as something that can be “associated with diverse 
human behaviors, with distinctions among them often less clear than for either 
artifacts or cognitions. Technological activities inevitably and without easy 
demarcation also shade from individual or personal into group and institutional 
forms.”29 This understanding of technology as primarily an activity aligns well with 
Foucault’s own use of the term technology, and also calls back to the term’s Greek root 
and its emphasis on skill. It is through this emphasis on technology that Foucault is 
able to sidestep both the structuralist and analytic philosophic traditions by focusing 
instead on a genealogy of the subject as contingent.30 The link, therefore, between this 
understanding of technology and the subject as contingent is precisely what allows 
Foucault’s work to move in such different directions from the humanist critique of 
technology as a corruption of the essence of man, which, as Stiegler31 acknowledges, 
would require a clear understanding of what human nature is in the first place. 
Therefore, Foucault’s use of technology is intimately connected with his anti-
humanist philosophy, which provides a major foundational thread for 
postmodernism.  
Before further exploring Foucault’s conceptualization of technology, it is 
worth emphasizing that the word ‘technique,’ also rooted in the Greek technē, is used 
as a very near synonym for technology in French, which is a slightly closer relation 
than the two words have in English: “in French, the words ‘technologie’ and ‘technique’ 
are used more or less interchangeably to refer to technology, with the latter term being 
somewhat more general and more often applied to technologies that pre-date 
industrialization.”32 The connection between these two terms is important for 
understanding the role of technology across the whole of Foucault’s work, because he 
uses ‘technique’ more frequently in his early works before he takes up the concepts of 
technologies of power and self in later work. I have drawn on Michael Behrent’s 
                                               
28 See Gerrie, Jim. 2003. “Was Foucault a Philosopher of Technology?:” Techné: Research in Philosophy 
and Technology 7 (2): 66–73. doi:10.5840/techne2003722. and Packer, Jeremy. 2012. “The Conditions 
of Media’s Possibility: A Foucauldian Approach to Media History.” In The International Encyclopedia 
of Media Studies, by Angharad N. Valdivia. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/9781444361506.wbiems005. 
29 Mitcham, Carl. 1994. Thinking through Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (as quoted in Gerrie 2003) 
30 Foucault, Michel. 1997. The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New 
York: New Press. 
31 Stiegler, Bernard. 1998. Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus. Meridian. Stanford, Calif: 
Stanford University Press. 
32 Chabot, Pascal. 2013. The Philosophy of Simondon: Between Technology and Individuation. London: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 22.  
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 article, which traces Foucault’s use of the terms technology and technique throughout 
his oeuvre as a map for this analysis.33 For example, Behrent is able to point to several 
instances where Foucault clearly uses these terms interchangeably, such as his 1978 
lecture, La société disciplinaire en crise: “My research deals with techniques of power, with 
the technology of power.”34 Understanding the close connection of these two terms for 
Foucault allows us to link his later explicit discussions of technology to some of his 
earlier references to technique. 
One important link between this work occurs in Archaeology of Knowledge.35 
Although most of this book is devoted to knowledge (savoir) in relation to discourse, 
the end of the work suggests that Foucault’s methods can also be expanded to a wider 
variety of practical discursive practices, of which painting and its related techniques 
serve as the primary example, as noted above. In other words, techniques/technologies 
themselves are understood as savoir: “In this sense, the painting is not a pure vision 
that must then be transcribed into the materiality of space; nor is it a naked gesture 
whose silent and eternally empty meanings must be freed from subsequent 
interpretations. It is shot through — and independently of scientific knowledge 
(connaissance) and philosophical themes — with the positivity of a knowledge 
(savoir).”36 Just an afterthought in Archeology of Knowledge, this relationship of 
technology to knowledge opens the door for the much greater role that technology 
will play in the development of Foucault’s tripartite schema of power, knowledge, and 
subjectivity, harkening back to the Sophistic understanding of technē which linked 
skills, techniques, and art to the formation of a wise subject.37 
The later lectures at the College of France focus more explicitly on what 
Foucault outlines as four major types of technologies: production, sign systems, power, 
and self, which all work together and overlap in various ways to produce an 
individual.38 Much of his work in the 1970s related to technologies of power, whereas 
his work in the 1980s shifted further toward technologies of the self. The technology 
of power is a form of external domination that objectifies the individual, while the 
technology of self allows individuals to effect, by their own means, operations on their 
body. It is the intersection of these particular two technologies, power as an external 
                                               
33 Behrent, Michael C. 2013. “Foucault and Technology.” History and Technology 29 (1): 54–104. 
doi:10.1080/07341512.2013.780351. Emphasis added. 
34 As quoted in Behrent, 59. 
35 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge.  
36 Ibid. 214. 
37 Roochnik, David. 1996. Of Art and Wisdom: Plato’s Understanding of Techne. Place of publication not 
identified: Pennsylvania State University. 
38 Foucault, The Essential Works. 
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 influence and self as an internal influence, that Foucault defines as governmentality 
and which plays a constitutive role in the process of subjectivation.  
It is in the Psychiatric Power lecture that we see Foucault explicitly connecting 
technology to power: “Discipline seems to me to be this technology, specific to the 
power that is born and develops from the classical age, and which, on the basis of this 
game of bodies, isolates and cuts out what I think is an historically new element that 
we call the individual.”39 Here, Foucault links the technology of discipline to a certain 
conception of man through its co-construction of the subject with the body, which 
necessarily asserts the contingent so-called essence of man. This connection to 
discipline extends in many directions throughout Foucault’s work moving forward, 
from his explicit descriptions of the Panopticon as a technology in Discipline and 
Punish40 to the power techniques employed by the sexual apparatus in The History of 
Sexuality 1: The Will to Knowledge41, which both emphasize the ability for technology to 
be used to constitute and manipulate individuals in ways that are more practical than 
ideology and subtler than violence.42  
The shift toward bio-power in the 1978 and 1979 lectures tracks the changing 
emphasis of power toward security and social control that begins in the eighteenth 
century. Foucault describes his work as undertaking a history of technologies of 
security, highlighting in particular the correlation between the techniques of security 
and population that gave rise to the modern concept of population.43 This represents 
the extension of study from the discipline of bodies to regulation of populations and 
allows him to define man as a figure of population, again emphasizing the contingent 
status of so-called human nature.  
The Subjectivity and Truth lectures, which serve as foundation for the History 
of Sexuality 3,44 explore technologies of the self through the question of how a subject 
is established by his or her own self-government, or self-care. The techniques of self 
                                               
39 Foucault, Michel. 2006. Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-74. Edited by Jacques 
Lagrange. Translated by Graham Burchell. 1. Picador ed. Lextures at the Collège de France. New 
York, NY: Picador. 
40 Foucault, Michel. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 2nd Vintage Books ed. New 
York: Vintage Books. 
41 Foucault, Michel. 1990. The History of Sexuality Vol. 1: The History of Sexuality. Vintage Books ed. New 
York: Vintage Books. 
42 Behrent, “Foucault and Technology,” 84. 
43 Foucault, Michel. 2007. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78. Edited 
by Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan : République Française. 
44 Foucault, Michel. 1986. The History of Sexuality Vol. 3: The Care of the Self. Vintage Books ed. New 
York: Vintage Books. 
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 are explored in these lectures as they relate specifically to sexuality and also serve as a 
way to understand such techniques as a method for completing a history of 
subjectivity. On the Government of the Living45 marks a turning point in which Foucault 
moves away from technologies of power and begins to expand his analysis to 
technologies of the self, considering the production of subjectivity in Greco-Roman 
and Christian cultures. Moving beyond even these epochs, Foucault explains that 
there are a variety of ways that one can examine one’s own conscience, which include 
the nature of the examination, the objective, and the instruments, showing how both 
the Greco-Romans and Christians used these tools in a unique manner.46 In other 
words, although Foucault has in this work focused on some of the particular ways that 
technologies of the self have been used by Greco-Romans and Christians, many more 
approaches are possible. Understanding how such technologies are used in an epoch 
is an important part of understanding the production of subjectivity.  
The role of the instrument in the process of examination of conscience and 
mode of subjectivation offer an opportunity for further exploration. Although 
Foucault gives the examples of concentration, memory, virtual discourse, confession, 
and writing for oneself or others, he acknowledges that such a list is not all-inclusive. 
Through this understanding of particular instruments within the larger framework of 
technologies of the self, there are potential connections to Stiegler’s47 work on memory 
and Kittler’s48 exploration of verbalization and writing in German literature.  
Throughout these 1980s lectures, Foucault explores these different varieties of 
subjectivation, which previously had been obscured to him because of his emphasis on 
the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century production of the subject through knowledge 
and power. What becomes clear through this extended exploration of subjectivity, and 
of utmost importance for our understanding of the role of technology in this process, 
is how large of a role the technologies of the self play in the process of subjectivation. 
For example, in Hermeneutics of the Subject,49 Foucault links these forms of self-
government in antiquity to the way one governs others, creating a broader political 
impact. The most important problem of our time, he argues, is not freeing individuals 
from an oppressive State, but rather promoting new forms of subjectivity through 
experimenting with technologies of the self. This prioritization, of course, links 
                                               
45 Foucault, Michel. 2014. On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980. 
Edited by Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. Translated by Graham 
Burchell. 
46 Ibid, 236-237.  
47 Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1. 
48 Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900. 
49 Foucault, Michel. 2005. The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982. 
Edited by Frédéric Gros. 1st ed. Lectures at the Collège de France. New York: Picador. 
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 Foucault to the Spinozan emphasis on experimentation50 in order to determine what 
a body can do. We cannot know ahead of time what forms of subjectivity will arise 
through our experiments with technologies of the self before we implement them.  
This link becomes clearer in his final two lectures. In The Government of Self 
and Others,51 Foucault argues that philosophy must not be limited to discourse alone 
but must put itself to the test of practices. This is explored somewhat abstractly 
through the concept of pārrhēsia, or the courage of truth, but is made concrete 
through the example of the Cynics in The Courage of Truth52 lectures the following year. 
For Foucault, the Cynics offer a rare example of living life as a test, as a form of praxis 
or aesthetics of existence. In the Cynic’s constituting of himself as a spectacle, this is 
a way to confront other individuals with their own contradictions. In this way, the 
Cynic’s self-care also becomes a care for the world. Experimentation with technologies 
of the self undergird the entire process of this experimental form of an aesthetics of 
existence, firmly foregrounding the conceptual importance of technology in the 
process of subjectivation, or informing the subject.  
 
Current Approaches 
Media archaeology has been popularized primarily through the work of Erkki 
Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka’s edited collection, Media Archaeology: Approaches, 
Applications, and Implications.53 However, media genealogy has been significantly 
underdeveloped in comparison. In this section, I explore several areas of scholarship 
that may have resonance with such an approach.  
 In a 2016 interview between Simon Ganahl and Erkki Huhtamo, published in 
Le foucaldien, Ganahl suggests that Huhtamo’s work on identifying topoi and tracing 
their trajectories to the present is actually a form genealogical work rather than 
archaeological.54 Huhtamo agrees, saying that, “genealogy is maybe an adequate term 
for my approach though I don’t regard topoi as patterns, as regular repetitions of ideas 
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 practices.”55 The larger point Huhtamo makes is that he is skeptical of the totalistic 
view that is a part of a Foucauldian episteme.  
 Another recent work to take a genealogical approach to media is Grant 
Bollmer’s 2016 book, Inhuman Networks: Social Media and the Archaeology of Connection.56 
In this work, Bollmer traces a deeper archaeological history of the concepts of 
networks and connection that pre-date contemporary computer-based conceptions. 
From a genealogical perspective, Bollmer also pays attention to the processes of 
subjectivation associated with these concepts of connection and networks, creating 
what he describes as inhuman citizens that are indistinguishable from other forms of 
technology which are also part of the network.  
 A major early push for a practice of media genealogy stems from the 2015 
Communication, Rhetoric, and Digital Media Symposium at North Carolina State 
University, titled “Media, Epistemology, Power.” One outcome from this symposium 
was a special collection of interviews published in the International Journal of 
Communication in early 2016. In writing the introduction to the collection of 
interviews, Jeremy Packer and Alexander Monea highlight that most of the scholars 
featured are not positioned in communications or media departments and would 
probably not identify their work as media genealogy, but none the less, their work 
resonates with some of the methods that would make up genealogical practices.57 The 
six interviews that make up the collection focus on historical assemblages of 
technology, epistemology, and power. For example, Mark Andrejevic’s work has 
examined the underlying political power structures of reality television, and, more 
recently, big data. In his interview, he argues that, “if you want to change society, you 
have to change it at the level of politics and the social and power relations. To fetishize 
technology and imagine that it somehow exists in ways that are independent of that, 
and can therefore affect a political change without an actual political process, just 
seems flawed to me.”58 The majority of the interviews in this collection highlight the 
genealogical work that elucidates the larger politics and social and power relations of 
a particular technological tool or apparatus, ranging through a variety of disciplines. 
 Notably, Peter Galison’s work with Lorraine Datson also introduces an 
exploration of the processes of subjectivation related to forms of scientific 
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 observation. 59 This connection between the development of objectivity in terms of 
the scientific self and the development of technological tools is at the forefront of 
much of Galison’s work.60 This emphasis links Galison’s work closely with Foucauldian 
notion of processes of subjectivation as they relate to technology. In its whole, this 
special collection offers a strong starting point for understanding what media 
genealogy might look like as a practice. However, I argue that it is possible to begin 
the development of a more robust methodological framework which can be used to 
extend media genealogical practices into further areas of exploration.  
  
Beyond Foucault: The Machinic Regime  
In order to develop methodological tools for practicing media genealogy, it is worth 
moving beyond Foucault’s work. The ontological underpinnings of Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari’s concept of assemblage, or agencement, offers a path for more clearly 
tracing the ways that processes of subjectivation are intertwined with larger social 
and political apparatuses. In addition, Guattari’s interdisciplinary work and 
insistence on the importance of art adds the possibility of actively intervening in 
processes of subjectivation in order to effect change. This roadmap for intervening in 
order to effect change is often left out of the more historically focused work of other 
scholars.  
By better understanding the role of in-formation in the process of agencement, 
one can more clearly follow continual and pervasive interactions. Tracing these 
movements provides more opportunities for understanding how to experiment with 
this process and its related process of subjectivation. Such experimentation involves 
risk precisely because we do not know ahead of time what a body can do. Spinoza 
argues that we may create new resonances that are favorable and extend and expand 
our abilities, but we may equally create experiments that are unfavorable and make it 
harder for us to act.61 When one is able to understand these processes of formation, 
they are better prepared to grasp and intervene in a critical moment with a new 
experimentation that can generate new lines of flight and processes of subjectivation. 
As explored in detail below, it is the postsignifying aesthetic paradigm of the 
artmachine that is best suited to the process of invention that generates these lines of 
flight. This follows Guattari's call to embrace aesthetic regimes for their attempt to 
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 experiment by looking forward.62 Further, postsignifying enunciation is the 
primary field through which art can battle empire, drawing upon concepts such as 
contagion and pathic transference.63 Finally, it is technics, as elaborated by Guattari, 
that determines the problematic field for invention, which links closely to Foucault’s 
conceptualization of technique/techne/technology and an insistence of media 
specificity.  
To draw these various elements together and understand the importance of 
technics to postsignifying aesthetics and its role in the machinic regime, one must 
begin by understanding what the machine is and how it operates. For Guattari, 
machines are not technical entities, but rather the conceptual operators of 
assemblages that, “define the conditions of possibility of technical works… explaining 
how cultures modulate the biological, the sociopolitical and the material in their 
assemblages.”64 Guattari explores the components of the machine most thoroughly in 
Chaosmosis, outlining six main components that concern individuation and processes 
of subjectivation:  
 ⁃ Material and energy components;  
 ⁃ Semiotic, diagrammatic and algorithmic components 
(plans, formulae, equations and calculations which lead to the 
fabrication of the machine);   
 ⁃ Components of organs, influx and humours of the human 
body;  
 ⁃ Individual and collective mental representations and 
information;   
 ⁃ Investments of desiring machines producing a subjectivity 
adjacent to these components;   
 ⁃ Abstract machines installing themselves transversally to the 
machine levels previously considered (material, cognitive, affective 
and social).65  
 
Let us consider each of these in turn, exploring how they might fit in with the broader 
genealogical method that has been developed.   
                                               
62 Guattari, Félix. 2008. The Three Ecologies. Continuum Impacts. London: Continuum. 
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 Though the machine and its processes of agencement can seem abstract, 
Guattari is clear that the process is always material in nature. The second component 
adds semiotics to the machine in a way that closely aligns with N. Katherine Hayles' 
conception of the cognitive nonconscious, allowing for thought that is beyond the 
conscious, human, or mental approaches to knowing.66 This collective assemblage of 
enunciation is larger than the cognition of an individual, extending across various 
levels of assemblages and encompassing the postsignifying regime. It is through the 
third component that the first two come to reside in a particular metastable 
individual, which might be a (post)human, computer, network, or some other 
assemblage, understood as a body without organs and its sets of electrical, affective, 
and chemical flows at various speeds.67 The human body can be part of this 
assemblage, but is not necessarily so. These three components of the machine are 
responsible for the process of individuation, connecting to produce heterogeneity.68 
The final three components of the machine relate to processes of 
subjectivation. The individual and collective mental representations of the fourth 
component refers to the "semiotic layers of mass-mediatised information, of the 
industry of social and commercial order words... which must not be confused with the 
structure of spoken language (French or English, for example), or with a technical, 
formal or scholarly language.”69 These semiotic layers are part of the larger collective 
assemblage of enunciation, created through the multiple and often contradictory 
discourses that influence the way we perceive the world. The discourse networks in 
which we are involved shape and may limit the way we interpret and understand the 
sensory information that shapes our perceptions of the world. In context of David 
Hume's philosophy, we can understand the creation of the subject as “an imprint, or 
an impression, left by principles, that it progressively turns into a machine capable of 
using this impression.”70 But the sense impressions and the machine both exist within 
already articulated discourse networks that thus constrain the construction of the 
machine.  
Sauvagnargues explains that it is through the fifth component, the 
investments of desiring machines, that particular bodies are both subjectivated by but 
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 also feed into a social machine that consists of coded flows.71 Importantly for Guattari, 
subjectivity is created adjacent to the components themselves, creating a complex 
relationship. Desiring machines produce a subjectivity that is adjacent to the 
components, but the resulting subjectivity is also the condition of desiring machines 
rather than the causal sum of them. Such a formulation means that there is a dynamic 
relationship between subjectivity and desiring machines, leaving open the possibility 
for experimentation and change. Experimentations with one’s processes of 
subjectivation can thus also alter one’s desiring machines. In other words, the choice 
that arises out of multiple forms of nonconscious cognition can and do transform 
subjectivity, at all scales of the assemblage from that of the individual to society at 
large. Finally, it is the abstract machine that is a diagram of the assemblage and holds 
together the previous five components of the machine. It is "an intensive map of 
relations of force that assemble... humans and materials, techniques and institutions.”72 
It is through this diagrammatic approach that experiments with processes of 
subjectivation are possible: "The abstract machine operates at whatever fractal level 
you want and enables you—as a variable in your possibilities of analysis, of your 
capacities to invest reality – to produce new modes of subjectivity.”73 Understanding 
the machine in this way makes clear the uncertain and always metastable state of the 
assemblages which surround us and also create us. For this reason, the aesthetic 
emphasis on experimentation is of utmost importance for generating new processes 
of subjectivation. Knowing the components of the machine and its diagrammatic 
approach to assemblage affords greater opportunity for intervention and 
experimentation with our own processes of subjectivation.   
 
Artmachines  
To summarize up to this point, it is the conceptual work of Foucault that provides 
the genealogical tools for creating the diagram, or as Deleuze and Guattari call it, the 
abstract machine that shows “the relations between forces which constitute power.”74 
Constructing this diagram is a necessary first step before one can proceed to 
intervening in it, because being able to understand the diagram allows one to more 
clearly see where there are opportunities to intervene and create new lines of flight. 
However, Foucault himself primarily used his diagram only as a way to study past 
epochs, rather than to generate experimental processes in the present. Although he 
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 pointed to the Cynics as an example of experimentation in the past, little was offered 
in his oeuvre related to thinking about one’s own contemporary position and 
processes of subjectivation. Therefore, we must add the concept of the artmachine to 
the Foucauldian diagram.  
It is the artmachine that facilitates experimentation of and through the 
technics with which we are part of an assemblage. Sauvagnargues defines the 
artmachine through its construction of an understanding of the image and the sign as 
real production rather than interpretation and language.75 Understood this way, art is 
intimately connected with semiotics due to its linkage with postsignifying signs. 
Production occurs as a becoming and thought is produced by an encounter with the 
sign: “Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of 
recognition, but of a fundamental encounter.”76 The sign that is encountered is also the 
bearer of the problem – it is the relation between thought and the sensible. The 
movement-image, as well as all other signs are "the modulation of the object itself.”77 
This concept of modulation relates to Simondon's rejection of Aristotelian 
hylomorphism. Rejecting the hylomorhpic imposition of form, information facilitates 
a continuous exchange between two metastable entities, drawing them into a common 
system or associated milieu. In this way, art inscribes the production of its sense into 
the material. It functions as a sign that is the bearer of a problem. How does this 
work?  
Aristotle offered an example of the brick and its mold to explain his 
relationship between matter and form.78 In this view, the mold impresses its form 
upon the matter (clay) to create the brick. Simondon argues that there is actually a 
reciprocal assumption of form occurring between the clay and the mold:  
Each molecule of the clay enters into communication with the 
pressure exercised by the surface of the mould, in constant 
communication with the geometric form concretised in the mould; 
the mould is as informed by the clay as the clay is by the mould, having 
to resist, to a certain point, the deformations of the material (the 
constraints it exercises on the mould). What this very simple, 
canonical example shows... is that at the level of technics itself, where 
the hylomorphic scheme appears to be triumphant, the individuation 
(of the brick) puts into play a … differentiation that operates in such 
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 a way that the mould and the clay 'modulate' together, concretely 
interacting.79  
From this example, one can see the importance of modulation to Deleuze's conception 
of the movement-image as modulation of the object itself.80 The encounter between 
thought and the work of art creates a sign that is modulated through problematic 
disparation: “In other words, art does not consist in imposing form upon matter, nor 
in producing a subjective effect upon sense, but in ‘following a flow matter.’”81 Art is 
instead about capturing forces.82 Conceived thus, art becomes indistinguishable from 
technics – both are forms of modulation in which “materials are captured and 
assembled into matter of expression.”83 It is the artmachine, then, that facilitates 
experimentation.  
 This suggests both a new methodology for communication studies and an 
approach to experimenting with new forms of subjectivity by exploring the various 
modulations that arise from different assemblages of technics. We can understand this 
process by returning to Guattari's final component of the machine – the abstract 
machine – and its capture of forces through a double becoming in the process 
of modulation, which is the creative process. Or, we might say, it is the affirmative 
process of construction through disparation. Gilbert Simodon, an influential source 
for Deleuze’s writing, draws his inspiration for disparation from the psychophysiology 
of perception which "designates the production of depth in binocular vision and 
addresses the asymmetry of retinal images, an irreducible disparity that 
problematically produces, through the resolution of their differences, binocular 
vision.”84 Disparation is creative in that it resolves the problematic of bi-dimensional 
images through the construction of a new tri-dimensionality of depth. Such is the 
affirmative and creative element of modulation.  
 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
This article has examined how Foucault’s genealogical methods can be seen to grow 
out of his earlier archaeological methods. The historical nature of media genealogy 
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 can cut across a variety of disciplines as it explores the larger political and social 
context of technological tools and media. In particular, this approach adds politics 
and processes of subjectivation to media archaeology. By adding processes of 
subjectivation to the analysis, a method can be developed for exploring the agencement, 
or assemblage of social and technical elements that make up a particular technology 
and shape those who use it, as well as the continued development of further 
technology. By drawing on the work of Deleuze, Guattari, and Sauvagnargues, this 
essay argues that critical and creative practices can be combined in the form of 
artmachines that allow for experimentation with new assemblages and intervene with 
experimental processes of subjectivation.  
 Although this article traces the theoretical underpinnings of this method, one 
questions that remains is how this theory would look put into practice. While more 
work, such as that by Bollmer, Galison, and Datson referenced above, has begun to 
focus on specific media and their associated processes of subjectivation, there is very 
little work that has attempted to then intervene in those processes. For example, 
Bollmer’s Inhuman Networks ends by suggesting that we must find non-networked ways 
of relating to one another, but does not go on to make suggestions or intervene in the 
processes of subjectivation explored in the work.85 Yet, this should not be interpreted 
as a shortcoming of such work, either. Writing such as this makes clearer the diagram, 
or abstract machine, to which these or other authors might later turn in order to 
create such interventions. Active interventions are traditionally largely outside the 
scope of much academic work, especially in the realms of the humanities and social 
sciences, where the emphasis is instead on theory, critique, and qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. 
 The full method proposed herein would extend the burgeoning practices of 
media archaeology and genealogy by actually creating an artmachine. In the example 
provided by Bollmer above, this would entail not only developing ideas for how to 
relate to one another in non-networked ways, but putting those into practice and 
reflecting on their impact on the processes of subjectivation. Do they, for example, 
begin to make a shift away from the inhuman citizens created by contemporary social 
media practices? While there are no precise guidelines for how to implement such a 
creative practice, there is other work that offers resonances and practices that might 
work well with exploring processes of subjectivation.   
Critical making offers one strong possibility for such resonances. Matt Ratto, 
in developing both this concept and method, aimed to bring together two types of 
work that have recently been understood as quite separate: “critical making is an 
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 elision of two typically disconnected modes of engagement with the world - ‘critical 
thinking’ often considered as abstract, explicit, linguistically based, internal and 
cognitively individualistic; and ‘making,’ typically understood as material, tacit, 
embodied, external and community oriented.”86 In further explaining this separation, 
Ratto notes that critical thinking is almost always understood linguistically, while 
making often tends to be interpreted as a form of rule-following such as putting 
together a piece of IKEA furniture.87 Therefore, juxtaposing these terms creates some 
cognitive dissonance. This method emphasizes non-linguistic a-signifying approaches 
to scholarship because it allows for a process of making that avoids the over coding of 
the linguistic strata. This is a material and embodied approach with an emphasis on 
creativity. 
  The materiality of making also serves an important role for Ratto in this 
process: “My goal is to make concepts more apprehensible, to bring them in ways to 
the body, not only the brain, and to leverage student and researchers’ personal 
experiences to make new connections between the lived space of the body and the 
conceptual space of scholarly knowledge.”88 This material emphasis also demonstrates 
clearly what Deleuze meant when he linked true critique with true creation. Ratto 
sees a similar connection: “One insight I have had is that the practices and modes of 
engagement that are typically called ‘critical’ and those that are equated with 
creativity and innovation are quite similar.”89 When making is the approach one takes 
to critique, it can be nothing else but creation. Such an approach offers an important 
shift in a landscape where social scientists most often critique and analyze without 
being involved in the process of creation. 
 In conclusion, the methods proposed in this article build upon the media 
archeology work that has been underway in the field of media studies and adds to it 
not only the emphasis on politics and processes of subjectivation, but also a call for 
an active an artistic intervention in the processes of subjectivation that have been 
diagrammed through this work. Critical making offers one possibility for such 
interventions. Importantly, this method is intended as a way to extend and continue 
previous archaeological and genealogical work rather than critique or replace it. By 
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 drawing on past diagrammatic work one is better positioned to implement a Spinozan 
ethics of experimentation within media and technology studies.  
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